Say a little prayer for Lahore

http://www.thenews.com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=208278

By Ahmad Rafay Alam
The only thing as incredulous as the recent announcement by the Government of Punjab -- it intention to construct a highway through the heart of Lahore -- was the recent statement of the CEO of Fashion Pakistan Week that their glorified display of clothes was a "gesture of defiance towards the Taliban."

Our fashion industry is as much of an industry as the Holy Roman empire was holy, Roman or an empire. Our designers are talented without doubt; but to suggest that parading scantily clad men and women down a runway behind the bunkers and barricades of a five-star hotel in Karachi is an act of defiance is, well, really stretching the limits to which the "security situation" can make a fool out of us. The foreign media took to the sound bite like a starving man to a steak and now, once again, Pakistan is portrayed as two-dimensional: a country teeming with brave designers, fighting Islamic militancy. My friend and critic Faiza S.

Khan said it perfectly in her column at openthemagazine.com:

"One designer lamentably laid claim to being 'a very brave woman' for displaying her clothes on a catwalk at a five-star hotel in a country where women have been known to be murdered, maimed, mutilated and on occasion buried alive, where girls' schools are routinely attacked and where, even at the best of times, women's rights, outside of a tiny income bracket, are limited at best. Another designer called it an act of defiance in the face of the Taliban, glossing over the fact that fashion shows do, in fact, take place with some regularity in Pakistan, and if one must intellectualise this, then it could more honestly be described as a display of affluence in the face of a nation torn apart by the gaping chasm between rich and poor. Why the foreign media can't ask Pakistani designers questions about their work and why they, in turn, yield to the temptation, like Miss Universe, of providing a sound bite on world peace is beyond me."

Over the weekend, the Chief Minister of Punjab announced that he was allocating Rs3.15 billion for a project to widen Lahore's Canal Road.

The decision can only be described, at best, as a reckless adventure and, at worst, a catastrophe waiting to happen.

In 2006, the Traffic Engineering and Planning Agency (TEPA) of Lahore Development Agency (LDA) proposed to widen the Canal Bank Road, purportedly to reduce traffic congestion in the city. Because the project was over Rs50 million, the provisions of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act,

1997 kicked in and TEPA was constrained to engage the National Engineering Services Pakistan (NESPAK) to carry out an environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the project. This was done and the EIA was presented to the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), Punjab, in a public hearing where hundreds of Lahoris gathered to protest against the decision to deprive the city of one of its last surviving environmental heritages: the 14 kilometres of green belt that line the canal and make the street one of the most unique avenues in the world.

The EPA, Punjab approved the EIA but before the project could go any further, the Lahore Bachao Tehreek (an umbrella organisation of dozens of grass-root NGOs as well as WWF-Pakistan) challenged the veracity of the EIA as well as the approval granted to it by the EPA, Punjab. The case remains pending before the Lahore High Court.

The announcement by the mhief minister, giving the go-ahead for the project "after completion of design", raises some important points.

First, it is clear that the project approved by the CM is not the project that the TEPA had originally proposed in 2006. For one thing, the cost of this new project is nearly five times the cost of the original design. Also, according to news reports, the new project is set to incorporate new features along the Canal Road (like "beautifications" which, I must hastily point out, in the context of roads means nothing).

What this means is that the Government of Punjab cannot use the EIA approval granted to the original TEPA project. According to our laws which, the last time I checked still apply to everyone including the government, road projects in excess of Rs50 million must have an EIA carried out and should be approved by the EPA.

But the observance of legal and procedural formalities is not the primary concern that most Lahoris have about the road widening project. It's an open secret that the Government of Punjab is operating on overdraft.

In such a situation, it would seem bizarre that the provincial government would choose to spend Rs3.15 billion -- nearly 10 per cent of the allocations it made last year to the three heads of health, public health and education -- on one road in one city of the province.

Less than 20 per cent of Lahoris have access to cars. For the vast majority of the over eight million people who try and live and work in this city, transport and mobility are dependent on motorcycles, cycles and what is euphemistically referred to as "public transport" (there are less than 1,000 buses that ply the city's streets). Ever since the previous tenure of Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, when the Punjab Road Transport Corporation was shut down, neither this nor the PML-Q government of Chaudhary Pervaiz Elahi have spent a rupee on public transport, which, by the way, is the only way to reduce traffic congestion in a city. Now we are told that a seriously broke government is about to spend billions of rupees it doesn't have on a road it doesn't need for people who don't want or use it. Remarkable indeed.

In a presentation made by NESPAK on August 31 this year, the various options of widening the Canal Road were presented to the CM. According to NESPAK, all the road widening projects would "fail" by 2020 -- meaning thereby that if the government didn't do something to invest in public transport, and soon, the billion-rupee road widening adventure is, at best, a 10-year frolic. Is the Government of Punjab serious? Does the chief minister not know that, according to the Punjab Economic Survey of 2005 carried out by the Planning and Development Department (P&D), over 50 per cent of Punjabis live in slums? Who is this road being widened for?

All too often our politicians harbor the mistaken belief that infrastructure development is the only thing that will make our cities "modern"; that infrastructure is the only thing that will attract the foreign investment necessary to bring economic prosperity to a developing nation. But where are the examples of the success of this model? Our own urban Guru, Arif Hasan, in his brilliant essay "The world class city concept and its repercussion on urban planning in the Asia-Pacific region" demonstrates that our preoccupation with a modern city is also the root of our urban decay. But who in the government reads? Thus, one can only pray for Lahore.



The writer is an advocate of the high court and a member of the adjunct faculty at LUMS. He has an interest in urban planning. Email: ralam@nexlinx.net.pk

conspiracies gone wild

http://blog.dawn.com/2009/11/19/extra-extra/

Posted by Nadeem F. Paracha on 11 19th, 2009

Islamabad, November 18: Famous anti-India TV personality, Zion Hamid, was caught yesterday watching Shakuntali, a popular Indian TV soap opera. The discovery was made by one of his fans who Hamid thought was his milkman.

When Hamid opened his door, the fan heard and saw the TV in the background where episode No. 5, 904 of Shakuntali was running. Talking to this reporter, the fan said that he first thought it was a conspiracy, but after noticing the genuine red cap of Hamid, he was astonished.

Shaken, the fan, 23-year-old Abdul Karim, said: ‘I couldn’t believe it! What would Muhammad Bin Qasim think when he gets to hear about this?’

When told by this reporter that Qasim died hundreds of years ago, the fan accused him and his newspaper for working for Blackwater.

‘What you think you fool Mossad, CIA, Raw agent Qasim alive in our minds, hearts and lungs so oh you shut up!’ he added.

Talking to the media after the episode, Hamid accepted that he sometimes watches Indian soaps and that even though he is of the opinion that Hindus are paleed (dirty), there is no harm in watching them on TV because they can’t touch you and can’t cast their shadow over you.

He added that he also watches Indian soaps to decode the hidden plots of the Hindus to destroy Pakistan and Islam.

‘It was by decoding the dialogue of one such Indian TV soap that I was able to discover that the Mumbai attacks were actually planned and executed by Raw and Mossad,’ he explained.

He also said that he predicted the 9/11 attacks as a Zionist conspiracy back in 1996 by watching Dil Walay Dullaniya Lay Jain Gey on his VCD player over and over again.

‘It’s all there,’ he claimed. ‘And the songs aren’t all that bad either.’

Hamid was surrounded by a vocal group of fans at the press conference.

One Barkat Ali told the reporters: ‘What this happening? Attacking great man Zion, oh so brilliant genius zindabad, zindabad you kafir Western conspiracy US agent traitors fool, fool, fool!’

Another, Sharmeen Khan, a 25-year-old university student added: ‘What this nonsense of democracy because it only Hindu, American, Zionist, Papua New Guinnean plot to destroy beloved Pakistian zindabad, zindabad, zindabad!’

Kamran Ghani, a seven-month-old toddler also addressed the press conference. He said, ‘Goo goo gagagaga goo goo … burp!’

The fans then lifted Hamid on their shoulders and carried him to a nearby McDonald’s outlet where they all chanted slogans like ‘Amreeka ki ghulami namazoor’ over a couple of Big Macs, large Cokes and a romantic song sung by Wali Azmat called, ‘I hate Jews Yea, Yea, Yea,’ a song from Azmat’s forthcoming album, ‘Zionists ate my Homework.’

The album is dedicated to all the Taliban who died in American drone attacks. When asked why didn’t he also dedicate the album to all those who’ve died from Taliban’s suicide attacks, Azmat said, that there were no suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan and that all those people we see slaughtered and dismembered on our TV screens actually died from dengue fever. When asked how he can prove this, he said that one should watch the third season of Buffy the Vampire Slayer.

‘It’s all there,’ he claimed. ‘And the chicks aren’t all that bad either.’

Meanwhile in Lahore, Tehrik-e-Imran chief, Insaaf-e-Khan lauded Zion Hamid’s efforts for decoding vital truths about Hindu conspiracies from Indian soap operas.

Talking to a group of rabid rightwing columnists at his residence, the great Khan said that Pakistan was in great danger from all kinds of plots being hatched by its enemies, especially Asif Zardari Bhutto Zardari Bhutto, Bilawal Zardari Bhutto Zardari, and the ghost of late Benazir Bhutto.

‘This government is sucking the blood of poor Pakistanis,’ he told the rabid rightwing communists all of whom then started to sing the national anthem in unison.

‘This government has sold Pakistan’s strategic and political interests to America!’ Khan added, to which the rabid rightwing columnists started burning George Washington and Abraham Lincoln’s effigies.

Praising the columnists’ bravery, Khan promised them to meet again after he returned from New York where he will undergo a cheekbone operation.

The columnists informed him that they too will be in New York for sightseeing, except for one, who got up and started burning Henry Truman’s effigy. He was the one who failed to secure an American visa.

Khan termed this to be racial discrimination and a CIA conspiracy.

Later in the day, the issue was discussed on a famous TV talk show on a local news channel.

Participating in the show were the incensed columnist, a rabid rightwing reporter, a PPP Minster, and a woman in a burqa.

‘This is an outrage!’ said the reporter. ‘Blackwater is behind this,’ he announced.

When asked how he knew, he picked up a Class One children’s nursery rhymes book and claimed: ‘It’s all here. And the rhymes aren’t all that bad either.’

The PPP Minister, Rehman Malika Zardari Bhutto Zardari, promised that his government will look into the issue, to which the reporter landed a swift punch on Malika’s face.

When Malika’s bodyguards tried to stop the reporter, the talk show’s host accused the government of curbing the freedom of the press.

‘This is an outrage!’ he said. ‘I implore the Army to intervene, overthrow this incompetent government and impose martial law!’

Mr. Malika apologised and started to land punches on his own face saying that the government too believed in the freedom of the press.

This made the reporter very happy who asked Malika to raid book stores and confiscate all secular literature because solutions to Pakistan’s problems lie in jihadi literature.

‘It’s all there!’ he claimed. ‘And the topics aren’t all that bad either.’

Turning to the woman in a burqa, the show’s host asked if she agreed.

‘The real problem lies in women wearing jeans,’ she said.

The host asked her to elaborate, to which she said: ‘The real problem is in women wearing jeans.’

‘Yes, but can you please elaborate?’ asked the host.

‘The real problem lies in women wearing jeans!’ she said again.

‘Please elaborate,’ the host insisted.

‘But that’s all I was asked to say,’ she said.

‘By whom?’ inquired the host.

‘By you!’ she said.

‘This is an outrage!’ said Mr. Malika, and in response, the host punched him and proceeded to burn an American flag. He burned half of it and announced that the other half will be burnt later because he had to catch a flight.

‘To where?’ asked Mr. Malika.

‘California,’ said the host. ‘I have to attend my son’s graduation ceremony.’


Nadeem F. Paracha is a cultural critic and senior columnist for Dawn Newspaper and Dawn.com.

islamabad -

- now islooites are already making movies about islamabad being ... well. kind of ... slack?

ahmed, aamer, yasir, sajjad - counter that please. perhaps no need to, since that's just rich-kids gibberish anyway ...





http://www.slackistanthemovie.com

war at the mall

credit to C.Bleuer, wherever he has it from.

3 Hauptsätze der Austrodynamik

(nach Das Trauma, ein Leben; Armin Thurnher)

Ich habe alles reiflich erwogen. (Kaiser Franz Joseph)

Ich bin dafür, die Sache in die Länge zu ziehen. (Oskar Helmer)

Ich sehe die Verantwortung darin, dass sie in der Zukunft liegt. (Michael Sika)

Pani ki kahani – Running on Empty

Pani ki kahani – Running on Empty

Where all the players, which in recent months were used by Pakistanis as scapegoats for all their sorrows come together – a report on Pakistan’s water crisis. It includes Kerry-Lugar, the sugar industry, WAPDA, Kalabagh and India – and brings it all together to give a meaningful insight of what goes wrong and what right. It is a report I have, indirectly and not knowingly, long waited for. Addressing issues that are a lot less fancy than bellicose Pashtuns, drugs or remote controlled peace-bringers, it unveils issues that are of great importance for Pakistan’s future and thus for AfPak. But while most of the pundits who address the AfPak situation directly try to find solutions on a scale that a single person or even task force is unlikely to be able to ever grasp let alone decide on (Rubin and Rashid call their own suggestions “audacious, naive, or impossible“; Rubin, Barnett R.; Rashid, Ahmed; From Great Game to Grand Bargain; Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008) this report does give perspectives that seem very much achievable if addressed.

Michael Kugelmann introduces the report well, with dismissing water shortages as a “viability” for Pakistan but acknowledging the issue’s gravity. The link to the first “shaitan-in-pak-public-opinion” comes, when he highlights, that the Kerry-Lugar bill identifies “access to potable water” as shared “compatible goal” between “the people of Pakistan and the US”. He then moves on to recommendations, which include moving away from planting sugar cane extensively and abandoning the sugar growing lobby (which includes my personal favourite evil) to the most important, referring to Kerry-Lugar again and basically quoting what I like to return, when a Pakistani tries to explain me that the looming failure is entirely someone else’s fault:

„Much more of a commitment will be required—and not merely
one of money, nor simply from Washington or the broader inter-
national donor community. Rather, a comprehensive commitment
is needed—one of time, funding, and other resources, and one that
comes not just from foreign friends and funders, but most importantly
from Pakistanis themselves.“

Simi Kamal argues:

„The focus needs to shift from provincial distribution to uses and users of water—in terms of both rights and responsibilities—and away from the Sindh-Punjab debate and toward a discussion of better-managed water for all of Pakistan.“

She addresses an important point here, that was my take-home message from the whole report. While I always believed, water issues in Pakistan are foremost a conflict between India and Pakistan over water rights (Indus Water Treaty) and how that poses a security threat to the area and even is one explanation why Kashmir is such a big issue, this report made me understand, that if the deficiencies within Pakistan would be solved, most of the threats facing the country, its agriculture and its people would already be dealt with. I didn’t believe Jack A. Goldstone and didn’t read his footnotes in “Population and security” (“Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict”, JIA, Fall 2002, vol. 56; footnotes xv: Aaron T. Wolf, "Water and Human Security" and Miriam Lowi, "Water and Conflict in the Middle East and South Asia: Are Environmental Issues and Security Issues Linked?") and would have rather gone with a guy I otherwise do not agree with in most points (Op-Ed by Zardari in the WashPost; see second last paragraph for that matter). But Simi Kamal (and others in the report in less direct manner) do advocate a focus on end user problems rather than trying to see “the big picture” all the time, here even trying to focus away from the second riparian conflict (Punjab vs. Sindh, after India vs. Pakistan).

Kaiser Bengali then gets down to some raw numbers with a helpful analysis, also briefly addressing the conflict with India, especially with respect to the recent construction of a dam on Indian’s part of Chenab river which (water-use wise) should be entirely entitled to Pakistan. He brings the major recommendation down into his title – “the need for a paradigm shift”.

Shams ul Mulk, former WAPDA chairman represents the technocratic part of the report, a stance that is, according to the other writers, highly overrepresented in the decision making circles and thus leads to major shortcomings (Bengali’s paradigm shift addresses exactly that). But especially his account of the construction of Tarbela dam (the biggest of its kind worldwide) is worth reading.

Feisal Khan than marks the centre piece of the report, addressing corruption and governance in the water sector, including the sugar industry, yield and water productivity and the waste problem affecting Pakistan’s water ways (e.g. only 7.7% of urban Pakistani waste water is treated).
I have earlier argued, that the suggestions in this report are straight forward and realistic. Khan puts that in relative, cautious perspective:

„As is apparent, these policies are relatively straightforward but, to
paraphrase von Clausewitz, while winning a war is a simple matter, it
is the simplest things that are the most difficult.“

Papers on Women’s role in water conservation and provision and and entrepreneurial approach are followed by a great insight in the urban planning aspect of waste and drinking water by James L. Wescoat who, as an Aga Khan Scholar at MIT has great insight and experience in Pakistan.

A single paper is dedicated to Lahore (Anita and Rabia Chaudhry) which ist he biggest city in Asia entirely relying on Groundwater!

Although – or just because - this report by the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars does argue for a paradigm shift away from discussions that are popularly associated with „water“ and „Pakistan“ – including the conflict with India and planned constructions of big dams like Kalabagh – to a focus on less fancy topics (women’s role, stakeholder awareness etc.) it is a document that hopefully has some influence on future decisons (or at least the voices of ist contributors) and is accepted as an important buidling block of the bigger AfPak picture.

The Other View

I am posting on The Other View, mainly on AfPak at the moment. Shorter pieces may not be published here anymore.

L'Usage de Monde - elections then and now

I am currently reading L’Usage de monde (The Way of the World in an English translation) by Nicolas Bouvier who travelled, accompanied by his friend Thierry Vernet by Fiat Topolino from Geneva to the Khyber Pass and on to India in 1953/54. I plan to give a lengthier account of the book as soon as I have passed through Iran and Afghanistan but want to mention here only two passages from Kurdistan which have some connections to Afghanistan, understanding it’s people and the recent elections.
Bouvier and Vernet are reaching Mahabad, a city in Iran inhabited to a big extent by Kurds. They are similarly attached to their weapons as Pashtuns along the Durrand Line. But Bouvier manages (contrary to many journalists who cover AfPak today) to look behind this affinity for weapons.

Knapp for Mahabad lasen wir einen bis zu den Hüften mit Dreck bespritzten alsten Mann auf, der wacker durch den geschmolzenen Schnee stapfte und dazu aus voller Kehle sang. Als er sich auf dem Beifahrersitz niedergelassen hatte, zog er eine uralte Knallbüchse aus der Hose und gab sie Thierry höflich in Verwahrung. Hier gilt es nicht als fein, eine Waffe auf sich zu tragen, wenn man das Haus eines anderen betritt. Dann drehte er jedem von uns eine dicke Zigarette und begann aufs neue sehr hübsch zu singen.

Later in the city elections have just been under way:

Jeder Anlass ist recht, um sich zu vergnügen. Die Leute von Mahabad versäumen keinen, und die soeben beginnenden Wahlen lieferten ihnen jede Menge von Anlässen. In einer Geschichte, über die man sich in allen Läden der Stadt totlachen wollte, fragt ein Mullah zwei Bauern, die sich vor der Wahlurne zu Boden werfen:

“Warum betet ihr diesen Kasten an, ihr Ungläugigen?”
“Hochwürdiger Mullah, er hat soeben ein Wunder vollbracht: Das ganze Dorf hat den Namen Kassem eingeworfen, und herausgekommen ist Jussuf!”


Und ein stürmisches Gelächter fegte die Politik samt allen ihren Schändlichkeiten hinweg.

Quest for the European Perspective

I have argued earlier, that the intellectual contribution from Europe on the AfPak situation was very limited. It is hard to find contributors to the ongoing discussions who

(a) have a profound insight and
(b) are publishing on a platform that is accessible via the net or newspapers/magazines.

Germany has some ranging from a good insight and knowledge of the region and its past (Scholl-Latour; a great thinker who traveled the area as well and still provides valuable ideas, but his times as a journalist in the area are over) to a good insight and knowledge with frequent visits to the area (Ladurner; I just don't agree with most of what he says) to people with insight producing a lot of crap (Todenhöfer).

Austria has Gudrun Harrer. Her output is limited to the newspaper DerStandard.
Switzerland has none that I would be aware of.

France definitely has some but I didn't have the time to go through their papers and interviews - apart from that my french is unfortunately quite poor.

Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, the Scandinavian countries and the Benelux are for that matter countries I don't know. Input appreciated. Same applies to Eastern European Countries. I don' speak or read Russian, so unfortunately I can't access their insights which are for sure vast, considering their long engagement in the region that lasts until now.

The first convincing contribution I have stumbled across now is from England.

Rory Stewart, a professor at Harvard who is also actively engaging in an interesting project in the old city of Kabul (Turquoise Mountain) has written relatively few comments on AfPak so far, but those struck me as very to the point. Check "The Irresistible Solution" on the London Review of Books which has been published in a short form in the Daily Telegraph. I would like you to note the titles - the media expects titles about "winning" or "loosing", whereas Stewart prefers to elaborate on more detailed thoughts and the "irresistible illusion" created by exactly that catchy media jargon ("It conjures nightmares of "failed states" and "global extremism", offers the remedies of "state-building" and "counter-insurgency", and promises a final dream of "legitimate, accountable governance". It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy."). That is taken to a further level in an even shorter piece for Time which is not satisfied with an evaluation but wants outright solutions, and not just humble ones - "How to save Afghanistan". It's written in easier language with explanations were I had to laugh ("...opium (used to make heroin)" and "... the majority are educated only one grade level above their students (if they are teaching second grade, they have a third-grade education)").

Apart from his first argument (papering over weaknesses with fancy words, something apparent with many experts who do not travel the region but are content with their observations from afar) I also can identify with many points he makes on the way ahead. Although a pacifist by legal terms (I voted not to join the army and agreed to not carry a gun for 15 years and stated that I have a pacifist world view) and to some extent by heart, I was in favor of the increased troop deployment to Afghanistan in recent months and am not sure whether I agree with Stewart's call for a decrease to 20 000 troops max. I do definitely oppose the "All out" ambitions of some American and many Europeans politicians. His arguments are simple and point again and again at local development and capacity building - something he himself does have experience at. Letting a hypothetical British policy maker speak in the ideas of Sir John Lawrence (19th century British viceroy in India) he states: "The presence of Nato special forces, the challenging logistical and political conditions in Afghanistan and lack of technological capacity, are likely to impede al-Qaeda from posing a significant threat to UK or US national security. Instead development in South Asia should remain the key strategic priority for the UK government." Something I feel is desperately needed at the moment, not only from Britain but other countries who wish to meddle in this area as well. A commitment to non-military-infrastructure development, seen as a strategic initiative.

Pointing at other pundits who churn out opinions, suggestions and solutions day by day he states, "To suggest that what worked in Iraq won't work in Afghanistan requires a detailed knowledge of each country's past, a bold analysis of the causes of development and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience."

The fact that there are so many pundits around who merely produce new solutions nobody will or can implement without the necessary insight coming from patience, should be the guideline for "The Other View" - we want to collect valuable views to shed light on a possible way ahead, not create just another dead-end of "irresistible solutions".

Afghanistan's last jew

Before the Russian invasion into Afghanistan, Jews and Hindus apparently were in charge of Afghanistan's finances. Most of the first group lived in the Herat region and further North towards Mazar-e-Sharif. It's hard to validate, but DAWN News claims to have a photo story on the last remaining Afghani Jew. Interesting in any case. Hindus do even have 1 representative in the Wolesi Jirga if I remember correctly.

The Team

Richard Holbrooke has been appointed by the Obama administration as the special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has subsequently assembled a team of experts under his wings that (according to George Packer in his New Yorker article) numbers around 30 people. Since this team is essential for the further progress of the conflicts in the area, the counter insurgency going on and possible prospects of rebuilding the Afghan economy and keeping Pakistan stable, I want to investigate the team’s members further and provide some information about them and their work to date.

Richard Holbrooke

In a recent New Yorker issue, George Packer published an insightful article (to date only available with subscription). It deals briefly with Holbrooke’s earlier assignments (Vietnam, Serbia/Bosnia), his character and how that enables him or hinders him to accomplish his present task.

According to this article, Holbrooke visits the area once a month.

George Packer on Richard Holbrooke, New Yorker Sept. 2009

To get a second view you may read the equally long article from the NYMag written by Meryl Gordon. It's from the last year of the Clinton era when Holbrooke was US ambassador to the UN and focuses more on his private life, his Jewish ancestors from Germany, and his then recent activity in Bosnia. It is perhaps less enjoyable to read but does leave away the (superfluous) nostalgia of being in an exciting place where danger looms 'round the corner - something that comes through in Packer's piece.

>> I am drifting of here to the point where brackets close again ... When he describes driving through Islamabad in Holbrooke's convoy, all streets cleared for them, "Islamabad felt like a capital under siege. We were driven at night from the airport to a barricaded hotel in a convoy of SUV that wove in and out of single file in evasive maneuvers ... blablabla". Yes Mr. Packer, your friends will be impressed by these stories and happy that you arrived home safely. But first you could have taken a taxi and it would all have been less siege-like - thus you (or "the Americans") are creating that feeling of being in a dangerous place yourself. Secondly those maneuvers are just because of those god-damn check posts placed everywhere. Add that and it all sounds less adventure-like. That you are riding around in SUVs is equally unnecessary, you could as well take normal (if you feel you really need it, fully armored) cars. I don't want to ride too much criticism against George Packer here, since I understand that he traveled as Holbrooke's company and thus extra security is advisable. But since other Americans who recently travelled the country (see e.g. William Harvey's blog) who came with aims like to "foster cross-cultural dialogue that improves relations between the U.S. and the rest of the world" have equally seen the country mainly from behind bullet proof glass and are then the ones who bring that feeling of danger back to the US, I believe that to visit the country in this way, and then present it to a wider public distorts our perception of the area and the wider problems we are dealing with. And based on this distorted perspectives, our public opinion (in democratic countries) decides on how to proceed in AfPak.

But Holbrooke himself brings it to the point, writing on Vietnam: "The terrible truth that people don't like to admit was that the war was fun for young men, at least it was fun if they were civilians or journalists." <<

Barnett Rubin

His recent articles definitely give important insights into the current problems.

According to Packer, Rubin acts as an independent contributor to Holbrookes team. He also has his own blog.

Rubin, Barnett R.; Afghan Dilemmas: Defining Commitments, The American Interest, May-June 2008 (accessed 19th September 2009)

Rubin, Barnett R.; Rashid, Ahmed; From Great Game to Grand Bargain; Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008

Rubin, Barnett R.; A Tribe apart; Boston Review

Vali Nasr

Nasr recently appeared on the Daily Show, unfortunately the interviews on the Show are seldom worth watching. Apart from that, the stuff he said wasn’t very convincing. He is equally bad, or probably even worse, at Colbert in April 2007, who is at least better in interviewing than Stewart.

A better insight is provided in an Interview from October 2002 at UCal. Forward to 28:00 for his insights on Pakistan, of which Nasr is considered to be an expert (oddly enough he is Iranian).

He was interviewed as an expert for a Frontline documentary on Iran (October 2007). As always a worthwhile watching PBS work. He gave an interview to them about Saudi influence on AfPak and one on the Shias and Karbala, both of which I haven’t read yet.

So far I haven’t read anything from him, so I am not entitled to voice further criticism. He is author of numerous books (Pakistan, Shiism)

Steve Berk

He is an agriculture expert from Florida with experience in Afghanistan. These guys have a nice website including a movie I wasn’t yet able to open.

Rina Amiri

Afghani by birth, she seems to be focusing on women's issues. A statement in front of the the House Comittee on Foreign Affairs is available here.

Vikram Singh

He gives some opinion on WorldFocus, rather shallow common talk if you are already familiar with issue. He is one of many scholars with insight who misses the chance to give a good explanation on the Kashmir issue, many pundits seem reluctant to even try to give an explanation on that while leaning out the window in other issues that are equally tricky. Of course standing in Kashmir at the moment promises a lot less exciting stories with gun fire and crying children than the AfPak border. It would be of great help though if some pundits would try to get on with that issue. Political pressure should especially be put on the Pakistani government in that respect to get their involvement in the Mumbai attacks resolved and unravel the links between LeT, JuD and continuous border crossings of Pakistani fighters in Poonch/Southern Kashmir. Steve Coll has given some great insight on the Back Channel talks. Sorry for getting carried away.

Burton M. Field

An Air Force General who, I assume, writes little. Find his bio here.

Jared Cohen

Him, I would just through in a bucket with Nicholas Schmidle, for whom I have little respect as a journalist or pundit. But that's probably unjust, so I will need to read his book first.

call for papers - the relationship between culture(s) and the Pakistani state

Link

Department of History, GC University, Lahore, Pakistan invites research papers for publication in The Historian, a referred bi-annual research journal. The next issue (Volume: 8 Number. 1, January-June 2010) is intended to examine the relationship between culture(s) and the Pakistani state. The papers should examine the institutional and pedagogical practices in the post-partition Pakistani society. We would keenly welcome theoretically innovative papers analyzing the nexus of culture and the state-craft in the contemporary Pakistan.

Possible areas of study may be:

Institutional Matrix in Pakistan (Military, Police, Bureaucracy)

Education as a controlling technology

Extremism, Modernity and Tradition

Pakistani Bureaucracy/Military as a cultural Elite

Pakistani institutionalization and cultural homo/heterogeneity

The contributors may also discuss other themes with the editor, The Historian, before submitting their papers. The length of the papers should be between 6000 to 8000 words. Please mail your paper with an abstract (400-500 words) by the 15 December 2009 to the editor.

Tahir Kamran, Editor, The Historian

AfPak Blogging List

A continuously updated list on blogs/think tanks dealing with AfPak, sorted according to quality/usefullness. Aimed at getting an overview of whats around. Suggestions are most welcome.

AfPak @ ForeignPolicy

Steve Coll

War Nerd

ICGA Blog

Brookings

pundit mayhem

Experts on AfPak sprout out of the ground like mushrooms - everyone gets his go at what it's all really about and what should have been done in the first place or what the future will definitely look like. While one would expect, that having so many smart people around who all know so much about this place that noone really seems to understand, the picture would become more clear, the floods of opinions and predictions on the topic just make the situation worse.

Think Tanks like the Foreign Policy AfPak channel, a source I generally trust generates news on the area faster than the truth can run. Tiedemann writes that the FATA is a "lawless region" - just because it doesn't obey American law doesn't mean its without any of it. The way many experts shape our image of this area is dangerous - the wrong perception we get leads us inevitably to wrong decisions.

Information that we is just as disheartening but at least not manipulated by opinion-shapers are the newest opinion polls of the Pakistani public by IRI.

An interesting discussion highlighting what the people in Pakistan think of it all is currently raging at LUMS, already discussed in the national media. As far as I understand the issue, these discussions are on the one side reason for optimism (ultimately these people (Pakistanis and Afghanis, Central Asians) will find a solution to the whole mess of the area, not the "experts" around the US and Europe), on the other side, they do still point in an ideologic direction which I find worrisome.

What every Af-Pak Pundit should read ...

... and read it closely. It doesnt just say "More troops".

McChrystal's Assessment

You may also read George Packer on the New Yorker reagrding that paper.

Finally - A Plan

The metrics for the AfPak conflict, as obtained from ForeignPolicy

I hope to find time to comment on these later.

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The goal of the United States is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.

Background: During his March 27, 2009 speech announcing our new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said "going forward, we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable." This paper outlines a process to fulfill that directive. The intent is to use this assessment process to highlight both positive and negative trends and issues that may call for policy adjustments over time.

Agreed Metrics: The supporting objectives of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy form the framework for evaluating progress. The indicators within each of the objectives represent a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures, intended to capture objective and subjective assessments.

Common Baseline: The ODNI provided a baseline assessment of the metrics on July 17, 2009 from which progress will be measured; this is our common start point.

Process: By March 30, 2010 and on regular intervals thereafter, the interagency will draft an assessment of progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a check and balance on the interagency, a separate assessment will also be produced by a Red Team, led by the National Intelligence Council.

Objective 1. Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

Metrics: Please see the attached classified annex.

Objective 2a. Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan.

Metrics:

1. Progress towards Pakistan's civilian government and judicial system becoming stable and free of military involvement
2. Pakistan's actions to take necessary steps to ensure economic and financial stability, job creation, and growth
3. Support for human rights
4. Development of an enduring, strategic partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan
5. Pakistani public opinion of government performance
6. Demonstrable action by government against corruption, resulting in incrwased trust and confidence of the Pakistani public

Objective 2b. Develop Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities; continue to support Pakistan's efforts to defeat terrorist and insurgent groups.

Metrics:

1. Effectiveness of Pakistani civilian, intelligence and military in conducting counterinsurgency operations across the clear-hold-build phases to defeat insurgent groups
2. Level of militant-initiated violence
3. Extent of militant-controlled areas in Pakistan
4. Effectiveness of Pakistani border security efforts

Objective 2c. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Pakistan.

Metrics:

1. Effectiveness of security, governance, and development assistance
2. Support from allies, international organizations, and other key players, including China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and UAE
3. Coordination of international efforts by the U.N.
4. Status of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan
5. Pakistani policies and resources committed to maintaining international support

Objective 3a. Defeat the extremist insurgency, secure the Afghan populace, and develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

Metrics:

1. Degree to which security operations are integrated into the overall COIN campaign
2. Level of insurgent-related violence
3. Public perceptions of security
4. Percent of population living in districts/areas under insurgent control
5. Percent of population living in districts/areas undergoing clearing operations
6. Percent of populations living in districts/areas "held" by coalition and/or ANSF and where "build" activities are ongoing
7. Percent of key lines of communication under government control
8. Effectiveness of Afghan border security efforts
9. Level of trust and confidence by the Afghan people in the ANSF's (Army and Police) ability to provide sustained security
10. Capability, to include size, of the ANA and ANP
11. Effectiveness of ANSF-ISAF partnered counterinsurgency operations
12. Ability of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibility
13. Level of corruption within the ANSF
14. Ability of the ANSF to handle their own logistics needs

Objective 3b. Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

Metrics:

1. Afghan Government's institutions at the national, provincial, and local level, including ability to hold credible elections in 2009 and 2010
2. Effectiveness of the Afghan Government in collecting revenues (both in absolute terms and as a percentage of budget requirements) and executing its budget at the national, provincial, and local levels
3. Public perception of Afghanistan's justice sector and commitment to providing the rule of law at the national, provincial, and local levels
4. Demonstrable action by the government against corruption, resulting in increased trust and confidence of the Afghan public
5. Support for human rights
6. Public perception at the district level of the Afghan Government's effectiveness and sustained ability to provide services
7. Afghanistan's economic stability and development with emphasis on agriculture
8. Volume and value of narcotics
9. Successful interdiction and prosecution of high-profile narco-traffickers
10. Afghan Government's efforts to develop and execute reconciliation programs at the national, provincial, and local levels with U.S. and international support

Objective 3c. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Afghanistan.

Metrics:

1. Support from allies, international organizations, and other key regional countries in providing resources to Afghanistan
2. Prospects for the Afghan Government and international community to fund the development, operations, and sustainment of the ANSF
3. Effectiveness of international security, governance, and development assistance
4. Establishment of accounting and management controls for UN coordination of international efforts
5. Ability of NGOs to operate independently and freely
6. Status of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan
7. Status of relations between Afghanistan and its other neighbors

Rethinking interests

Raul R. Pillar is probably right with his theory , that terrorists (foremost al-Qaeda) do not necessarily need Afghanistan as a safe haven to attack the US in future and that the presence of US troops in the area should not be justified with just this target – to eradicate such breeding places. Also he draws a reasonable parallel to the Vietnam war (most of those Afghanistan-Vietnam parallels being mostly far fetched) in saying, that the Johnson administration overestimated the effect a communist Vietnam might have on the surrounding east Asian states and likewise the Obama administration and its supporters may be wrong assuming that an unstable Afghanistan will pull Pakistan and other Central Asian states in (other authors have claimed rightly, that during Afghan Taliban rule, the situation in Pakistan was a lot more stable than it is nowadays!).

But I fail to see, why this conclusion allows us to immediately jump to the assumption, that US presence (and probably the whole NATO presence as well, since when the US would leave, countries like Germany and Britain will hardly be made to stay) should be stopped in the region. Is our only target to make sure we are not attacked from a make-shift camp by bearded men? Are we only worried about having blood in our own streets? What about the countries of the region? Afghanistan is economically and educationally speaking in a dire situation, major areas in Pakistan are not doing any better and countries like Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan are neither sporting promising records. While other nations like Japan and Norway have long understood, that making a difference in this region takes patience, time and skilled labour we are only discussing money, arms and our own casualties.

As Ahmed Rashid recently pointed out to one of the few Americans who were venturing Pakistan outside their Islamabad embassy recently "You want to win over the people? Show me one school the Americans have built. Show me a road, a hospital, a railway." . Other European countries (with a few exceptions) have an equally poor record. Some NGOs pull in after major disasters but leave soon after. There is seldom a long term commitment. As Rashid has pointed out in his recent book , the opportunity for Nation Building may have already passed, and other writers have argued that the US should not linger around anymore with this argument, since its record was poor enough in this respect . But an effort to bring a lasting peace to the region and aim for an economic development including surrounding regions (Iran, Xinjiang, Balochistan, Ferghana) should be made and attempted now. This does at the moment still include army presence, the Afghan army and police are far away from managing the situation themselves and the Pakistanis can in this regard unfortunately still not be trusted (especially the ISI). But while dismembering al-Qaeda should still be a good reason to stay and even enlarge CIA presence , there are other issues apart from our homeland security, that should make us aware of our responsibilities abroad.

Further Reading

Who’s Afraid of A Terrorist Haven?; Washington Post, 16th of September 2009 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091502977.html; last accessed 20th September 2009)

http://harmonybeat.blogspot.com/2009/08/happy-independence-day.html

Rashid, Ahmed; Descent into Chaos – The United States and the failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia; Allan Lane 2009

http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2009/09/coalition_issue.php

http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2009-09/afghanistan-cia-ausbau

Descent into Information Chaos – Our Failure to get the picture of the situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia

One does not need to read Ahmed Rashids recent book , to understand that the involvement of the US and the NATO in Afghanistan may be necessary but the way it is currently undertaken is flawed and may at worst have an even worsening effect to the whole situation. To get a grasp of what the ideal solution would be we need to stand back and listen to people who know the complexities of the area - at best experts on Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian states, China and the US each and others who are able to link this knowledge together to a coherent picture.

Why Europe needs to contribute more

Focusing on the geographical core of the problem, the Afghanistan- Pakistan region itself, unfortunately most of the material available comes from American sources – which is problematic in two aspects. Firstly, most of the US writers on AfPak focus foremost on the impact of the conflict on their homecountry, judging from Washington, often calling themselves „National Security Experts“ and often missing the gerater picture when imminent threats to the US are not given. Secondly when staying in the area itself the foreigners one meets in public space are non-American. Americans are mostly barred from moving around freely or don’t even come in the first place. Nationalities who are present in larger numbers (outside their respective embassies, travelling, researching or working in normal jobs and thus arguably being able to get the picture) are French, Chinese and Japanese, the latter’s views (via blogs or research papers) hardly accesible to Europeans and Americans who are not familiar with their language.

The material, based on which we and the governments in Europe and America (which are the two continents currently contributing to the US led actions in the area) form our opinion can thus hardly be called reliable. Americans who have insight in the area and travel the countries frequently like Barnett Rubin or Steve Coll are rare and not listened to enough, European viewpoints are rarely available at all and if, often not in English translation. Local contributors to the discussion (foremost the Pakistani intellectual and blogging scene) are available but to a big extent still not free of a continuous anti-India complex which is detrimental to unbiased work. Papers by Afghanis from inside the country are only slowly becoming more accesible.

Preferring the hedgehog approach

A recently published book review by Philip Tetlock addresses the different tactics in political forecasting and his terms may be just applied to the available forecasts on the AfPak situation - there are too many hedgehogs around and too few foxes. Tetlock calls experts, „who know one big thing from which likely future trends can be deduced“ hedgehogs, whereas experts, „who know many things and are not finicky about where they get good ideas“ are the foxes. Many writers try to make out the ultimate failure of US involvement less by arguing with different scenarios and arguments why this will be so (which would give good hints where to start to improve the approach), but rather – and that is the cheapest but most often applied argument – because they see Vietnam and the famous destruction of the Britsh Army under William Elphinstone by Akbar Khan in 1842 on the dooming horizon when new casualties of soldiers of their respective country are reported. What we and the governments, if they are willing to listen to people who have a clue, need are analysis that dissect the problem and give possible starting points to improve. Even if they are „audacious, naive, or impossible“ – but as Barnett Rubin and Rashid Ahmed rightly point out, „without such audacity, there is little hope“ . And thats what we hang on to in the end.

Where asking the wrong questions matters

In a recent edition of the Economist (16th of July 2009), one article was dedicated to a survey carried out in the US evaluating the views of the American people on the war in Afghanistan. The major question was whether „the US is winning the war in Afghanistan“. People are quick to answer this question – many have a firm opinion on it. But if you would keep asking and let each person define his idea of victory, most wouldn’t have a clue what to answer. Again borrowing from Rubin and Rashid, we need to let go of „“victory“ as the solution to all problems“ and first be clear about the objectives of the intervention and who exactly the enemy is . People in Europe (and I believe similarly in the US) are not aware of who Taliban and al-Qaeda inside Afghanistan and Pakistan really are and that people who are strongly opposing Karzai/Zardari and Americans may at the same time be strong opponents of the Taliban (even the major part of the population in both countries belongs to this group).

As long as the media and writers on this area are not able to give as the whol,e true picture, and decision makers are not prepared to draw knowledge from people who are based in the area and know ist people (to send just Richard Holebrooke there as an envoy on and off and excpect that one thinker and dealer will do is crazy) we will keep making wrong decisions and the ultimate chaos Rashid is picturing in his book will hardly be inevitable.


Further Reading:

Rashid, Ahmed; Descent into Chaos – The United States and the failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia; Allan Lane 2009

Tetlock, Philip; Reading Tarot on K Street; The National Interest, September/October 2009 (http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22040; accessed 19th September 2009)

Rubin, Barnett R.; Rashid, Ahmed; From Great Game to Grand Bargain; Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008

Rubin, Barnett R.; Afghan Dilemmas: Defining Commitments, The American Interest, May-June 2008 (http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=423; accessed 19th September 2009)